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SYMPOSIUM PAPER
DRIVING TO THE PANOPTICON: A
PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLORATION OF THE RISKS
TO PRIVACY POSED BY THE HIGHWAY
TECHNOLOGY OF THE FUTURE
Jeffrey H. Reimant
... the major effect of the Panopticon [is] to induce in the inmate a
state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the auto-
matic functioning of power.
Michel Foucault
If we can never be sure whether or not we are being watched and
listened to, all our actions will be altered and our very character
will change.
Hubert Humphrey
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect lib-
erty when the government's purposes are beneficent.
Louis Brandeis
According to the IVHS AMERICA Legal Issues Committee,
"IVHS [Intelligent Vehicle Highway Systems] information systems
[will] contain information on where travelers go, the routes they use,
and when they travel. This information could be used to disadvantage
individuals, and should be secure."' This is from a list of what the
Privacy Task Group of the Legal Issues Committee calls, interestingly,
" 'Strawman' Privacy Principles." I hope that my title, "Driving to the
Panopticon," indicates to you that I don't regard the threat to privacy
posed by Intelligent Vehicle-Highway Systems as a strawman at all.
Nor do I think that vague reference to use of information to individu-
als' disadvantage does anymore than begin to hint at the nature of that
threat.
Copyright 1995 Jeffrey H. Reiman.
t William Fraser McDowell Professor of Philosophy American University, Washington,
D.C.
1. IVHS AMERICA Legal Issues Committee, 'Strawman' Privacy Principles - Comment
Form, at 2.
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The Panopticon was Jeremy Bentham's plan for a prison in
which large numbers of convicts could be kept under surveillance by
very few guards. The idea was to build the prison cells in a circle
around the guard post. All the prisoners would be silhouetted against
light coming into the cells from windows on the outside of the circle.
Their movements would be visible to a single guard in the center. The
French philosopher Michel Foucault used Bentham's Panopticon as an
ominous metaphor for the mechanisms of large-scale social control
that characterize the modem world.2 He contended that it became,
perhaps subconsciously, the model for institutions in nineteenth-cen-
tury Europe and America. "Is it surprising," asked Foucault, "that
prisons resemble factories, schools, barracks, hospitals, which all re-
semble prisons?"3
As Bentham realized and Foucault emphasized, the system works
even if there is no one in the guard house. The very fact of general
visibility-being seeable more than being seen-will be enough to
produce effective social control.4 Indeed, awareness of being visible
makes people the agents of their own subjection. Writes Foucault,
He who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, as-
sumes responsibility for the constraints of power; he makes them
play spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in himself the power
relation in which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes
the principle of his own subjection.5
Foucault went on to stretch the panopticon metaphor beyond ar-
chitecture to characterize the practices of conventional medicine, psy-
chology and sex education, all of which he thought subject us to
increasing social control because they create a world in which the de-
tails of our lives become symptoms exposed to a clinical gaze-even
if no one is actually looking.' I want to stretch the panopticon meta-
phor yet further, to emphasize not just the way it makes people visible,
but the way that it makes them visible from a single point.
An intriguing and illuminating feature of the suspicion about the
threat to privacy posed by IVHS is that the information that would be
2. MicHEL FoucAuLT, Discmitur AND PUNISH: TmE BmTH OF'Tm PRISON 195-228 (Alan
Sheridan trans., New York: Vintage Books 1979) [Hereinafter DiscnL'Nr] See p. 200 for a
description of the architecture envisioned by Bentham.
3. Id. at 228.
4. "[I]t is at once too much and too little that the prisoner should be constantly observed
by an inspector. too little, for what matters is that he knows himself to be observed; too much,
because he has no need in fact of being so", DiscipLn, at 201.
5. Id. at 202-03.
6. "The panoptic schema... was destined to spread throughout the social body; its voca-
tion was to become a generalized function", Id. at 207; see also 211-16.
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accumulated by it is public. Wherever we drive, we drive in the pub-
lic world, and thus normally subject to unobjectionable public obser-
vation. Courts have held that normal observation by police officers in
or from public places does not intrude on a person's private affairs.
And this has been specifically applied to "the following of an automo-
bile on public streets and highways,"7 even when the following was
done by tracking a beeper planted on an object in the driver's posses-
sion. In U.S. v. Knotts, the Supreme Court held that "While in [their]
vehicles on public roads..., [t]he defendants had no privacy interest in
what could have been visually observed in these public places." 8
If there is a threat to privacy from IVHS, it comes from the fact
that-as readers of detective fiction well know-by accumulating a
lot of disparate pieces of public information, you can construct a fairly
detailed picture of a person's private life. You can find out who her
friends are, what she does for fun or profit, and from such facts others
can be inferred, whether she is punctual, whether she is faithful, and
so on. Richard Wasserstrom observes, in an article first published in
1978, that the information already collected in data banks at that time,
if gathered together, could produce a "picture of how I had been living
and what I had been doing ...that is fantastically more detailed,
accurate, and complete than the one I could supply from my own
memory."9
There is, then, something to learn about privacy from the sort of
threat that IVHS represents: namely, that privacy results not only from
locked doors and closed curtains, but also from the way our publicly
observable activities are dispersed over space and time.' If we direct
our privacy-protection efforts at reinforcing our doors and curtains, we
may miss the way in which modem means of information collection
threaten our privacy by gathering up the pieces of our public lives and
making them visible from a single point. This is why the panopticon
is a more fitting metaphor for the new threat to privacy than, for ex-
ample, that old staple, the fishbowl.
But a threat to privacy is only worrisome insofar as privacy is
valuable or protects other things that are valuable. No doubt privacy
is valuable to people who have mischief to hide, but that is not enough
to make it generally worth protecting. However, it is enough to re-
mind us that whatever value privacy has, it also has costs. The more
privacy we have, the more difficult it is to get the information that
7. U.S. v, Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983).
8. lL
9. Richard Wasserstrom, Privacy: Some Arguments and Assumptions, in PmL.OsoPMcAL
DmmNSIONS OF PrVACY, 325-26 (Ferdinaud Schoeman, ed., 1984) [hereinafter PDOP].
1995]
30 COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
society needs to stop or punish wrongdoers. Moreover, the curtain of
privacy that is traditionally brought down around the family has often
provided cover for the subjugation and abuse of women and children.
Privacy is not a free lunch. To believe, as I do, that privacy is essen-
tial to a free society is to believe that it is worth its costs. But then
freedom, itself, is not a free lunch. A free society is a dangerous and
often chaotic one. Let us then look at the value of privacy.
By privacy, I understand the condition in which other people are
deprived of access to either some information about you or some ex-
perience of you. For the sake of economy, I will shorten this and say
that privacy is the condition in which others are deprived of access to
you. I include experience alongside information under access, since I
think that privacy is about more than information. Your ability to take
a shower unwatched is part of your privacy even though watchers may
gain no information about you that they didn't already get in their high
school biology course. Or, if you think that they might after all gain
some information about your particular physiognomy, I would say that
it is a matter of privacy that you are able to keep your body unob-
served even by people who have already seen it and thus who already
have that particular information. This said, I shall primarily speak of
the value of privacy regarding information, since it is information
about us that will be collected by IVHS.
Note that I have defined privacy in terms of the condition of
others' lack of access to you. Some philosophers, for example Charles
Fried, have claimed that it is your control over who has access to you
that is essential to privacy. According to Fried, it would be ironic to
say that a person alone on an island had privacy.' 0 I don't find this
ironic at all. But more importantly, including control as part of pri-
vacy leads to anomalies. For example, Fried writes that "in our cul-
ture the excretory functions are shielded by more or less absolute
privacy, so much so that situations in which this privacy is violated are
experienced as extremely distressing."" But, in our culture one does
not have control over who gets to observe one's performance of the
excretory functions, since it is generally prohibited to execute them in
public.' 2 Since prying on someone in the privy is surely a violation of
10. Charles Fried, Privacy, in PDOP, supra note 9, at 209-10.
11. Id. at 214.
12. If it is said that such prohibition doesn't take away your ability to display such func-
tions, it only ups the cost of doing so, then it will follow that no one has any privacy in his home
since crooks can break in even though it is prohibited. On the other hand, it might be objected
that I can after all invite someone to watch me perform my excretory functions, and in this sense
even the privacy that I have here includes my control over who gets access to me. But to think
that this shows that such privacy necessarily includes control, one would have to maintain that if
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privacy, privacy must be a condition independent of the issue of
control.1 3
It's easy to get confused here since there are some private matters
in which control is of great importance. For example, we don't simply
want to restrict access to our naked bodies, we want to be able to
decide who gets to see or touch them. The privy should remind us,
however, that cases like these do not exhaust our interest in privacy.
To include control in the definition of privacy would restrict our un-
derstanding of the value of privacy to only that part of privacy in
which control is important-which is precisely the result in Fried's
case. He ends up taking privacy to be a value because it gives us a
kind of scarce resource (access to ourselves) to distribute. And he
claims that our ability to distribute this resource is the key to our abil-
ity to have intimate relations. 4 I think that Fried is wrong about inti-
mate relations, since I think that intimate relations are a function of
how much people care about each other, not how much they know
about each other. One may have an.intensely intimate relationship
with someone without-or at least before-sharing a lot of private
information with them; and one can share private information with
one's shrink or priest or even with a stranger on an airplane without
thereby having an intimate relationship with them.
If we include control in the definition of privacy we will find the
value of the sort of privacy we want in the bedroom, but not of the sort
we want in the bathroom. In our bedrooms, we want to have power
over who has access to us; in our bathrooms, we just want others de-
prived of that access. But notice here that the sort of privacy we want
in the bedroom presupposes the sort we want in the bathroom. We
cannot have discretion over who has access to us in the bedroom un-
less others lack access at their discretion. In the bathroom, that is all
we want. In the bedroom, we want additionally the power to decide at
our discretion who does have access. What is common to both sorts
of privacy interests, then, is that others not have access to you at their
discretion. If we are to find the value of privacy generally, then it will
have to be the value of this restriction on others. Sometimes its value
I couldn't invite a witness in to watch (say, because of draconian laws or unfailing taboos against
doing so), that would mean that those functions were no longer shielded by privacy-and that
sounds quite implausible.
13. Ruth Gavison gives additional reasons for excluding control from the definition of
privacy. Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, in PDOP, supra note 9, at 349-50.
14. "But intimacy is the sharing of information about one's actions, beliefs, or emotions
which one does not share with all, and which one has the right not to share with anyone. By
conferring this right, privacy creates the moral capital which we spend in friendship and love"
Fried, supra note 10, at 211. I criticize this view in Privacy, Intimacy and Personhood, 6 Philos-
ophy & Public Affairs 26-44(Fall 1976) reprinted in PDOP, at 300-16.
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will lie precisely in the fact that the restriction leaves room for our
own control. But other times it will lie just in that others lack the
access. And this is important for our purposes, since the information
that IVHS systems will gather is not the sort which it will be terribly
important for us to be able to give out at our discretion. It will be
information that we simply do not want others to have.
From the definition of privacy just given follows a specific con-
ception of the right to privacy. The right to privacy is not my right to
control access to me-it is my right that others be deprived of that
access."1 In some cases, though not all, having this right will protect
my ability to control access to me.Having privacy is not the same thing as having a right to privacy.
I can have either without the other. I can have privacy without the
right to privacy, say, when I successfully conceal iny criminal activi-
ties. And, I can have a right to privacy and not have privacy, say,
when others successfully violate the right.
For there to be a right to privacy, there must be some valid norm
that specifies that some personal information about, or experience of,
individuals should be kept out of other people's reach. Such norms
may be legal. I've already quoted some of the legal norms governing
the right to privacy in the United States.' 6 If, however, we think that
people ought to have others deprived of access to some of their per-
sonal affairs whether or not a law says so, then we think that there is
(something like) a moral right to privacy. And we will want our laws
to protect this moral right by backing it up with an effective legal
right. Since I think that IVHS threatens our privacy in ways that go
beyond current legal rights, I am concerned to defend a moral right to
privacy.
To say that someone has a moral right to privacy doesn't say
much unless we know what the scope of that right is, what things or
activities a person has a right to keep out of other people's view. For
anyone who doesn't live in a cave or in a desert, a completely private
life is impossible. Normally, we will think that some things are
rightly within the scope of a person's privacy (say, their religious be-
liefs), and other things (say, the color of their eyes) are not. Often, as
15. It might be objected that, if I have a right that others be deprived of access to me, then
I can waive that right, and thus effectively I would have the right to grant individuals access to
me. This would bring control back in, not back into the definition of privacy, but into the
definition of the right to privacy. But, there are rights that people have but cannot waive in the
sense here needed. For example, my right to life is not generally taken as one that I can waive
and thereby have a right to stop living; and my right to not be enslaved is not generally taken as
one that I can waive and thereby have a right to sell myself into slavery.
16. See notes 7 and 8 above, and accompanying text.
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cases like Roe v. Wade 7 and Bowers v. Hardwick 8 show, precisely
what should or should not come under the scope of the right to privacy
is controversial. As these cases testify, some will argue that citizens
of a free society should have as extensive a right to privacy as is com-
patible with reasonably safe social coexistence, while others will ar-
gue that only certain specific areas of people's lives (for example,
bodily processes, intimate relationships, activities relating to the for-
mation of political opinions and plans) should be protected. And, as
the tension between current law and fears about IVHS shows, there is
disagreement over whether the accumulation of bits of public informa-
tion should come under the scope of privacy.
To resolve such disagreements, .we must get clear on the value of
privacy. If we know why having privacy, or, equivalently, having an
effective right to privacy, is an especially important and good thing for
human beings, we will be able to determine what must come under the
scope of privacy for that value to be realized.
To do this, I propose that we imagine together the world in which
the full IVHS project is completed, and then see what losses we might
suffer as a result of the information about us that would then be gath-
ered. Here it is of great importance that a fully developed IVHS will
not exist in an informational vacuum. IVHS's information will exist
alongside that provided by. other developments already in existence
and likely to grow, such as computerization of census and IRS infor-
mation, computer records of people's credit-card purchases, their bank
transactions, their credit histories generally, their telephone calls, their
medical conditions, their education and employment histories, and of
course the records of their brushes with the law, even of arrests that
end in acquittal. Add to this the so-called "information highway" on
which we will all soon be riding, with its automatic recording of all
interactions, not to mention the FBI's desire to keep it eternally wire-
tappable.' 9 It has been observed, by the way, that as people conduct
the business of their daily live's more and more via digital communi-
cations, mere knowledge of who people call-knowledge now readily
available to police agencies-"would give law enforcers extensive ac-
cess to people's habits and daily activities."'2
It is this whole complex of information-gathering that I think
threatens us. It is this whole complex that, in its potential to make our
17. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
18. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
19. Interestingly, the "information highway" is the inverted image of IVHS: here the intel-
ligence comes first and then the roadways.
20. John Schwartz, Industry Fights Wiretap Proposal: Group Says Clinton Plan Would
Scare Consumers Off 'Data Highway', Wash. Post, Mar. 12, 1994, at Cl, C7.
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lives as a whole visible from a single point, brings to mind the panop-
ticon. Accordingly, it is as helping to bring about this whole complex
that I shall consider the threat posed by IVHS.
It might seem unfair to IVHS to consider it in light of all this
other accumulated information-but I think, on the contrary, that it is
the only way to see the threat accurately. The reason is this: We have
privacy when we can keep personal things out of the public view.
Information-gathering in any particular realm may not seem to pose a
very grave threat precisely because it is' generally possible to preserve
one's privacy by escaping into other realms. Consequently, as we
look at each kind of information-gathering in isolation from the others,
each may seem relatively benign.2 However, as each is put into prac-
tice, its effect is to close off yet another escape route from public ac-
cess, so that when the whole complex is in place, its overall effect on
privacy will be greater than the sum of the effects of the parts. What
we need to know is IVHS's role in bringing about this overall effect,
and it plays that role by contributing to the establishment of the whole
complex of information-gathering modalities.
I call this whole complex of which IVHS will be a part the infor-
mational panopticon. It is the risks posed to privacy by the informa-
tional panopticon as a whole that I shall explore.
Ride with me, then, into the informational panopticon and con-
sider what we stand to lose if our lives become generally visible. I
think that we can characterize the potential risks under four headings:
First, the risk of extrinsic loss of freedom; second, the risk of intrinsic
loss of freedom; third, symbolic risks; and, fourth, the risk of psycho-
political metamorphosis. All these strange titles will become clear in
due course. I have given the last category a particularly unwieldy and
ugly title precisely because it is the one that I regard as least familiar,
most speculative and most ominous. The reference to Kafka is inten-
tional. This said, I should add that these headings are not put forth as
airtight metaphysical divisions. They are meant simply to get unruly
ideas under control. Like many philosophical categories, they will
crumble if pressed too hard. If, however, we see them for what they
are, they will give us an orderly picture of the risks that IVHS and the
rest of the informational panopticon pose to privacy. But, more, this
picture will be just a negative image of the value of privacy.
21. Fried observes in a note that "so long as the mails are still private, wire tapping may
not be so severe an imposition, particularly if people do not in any case consider telephone
conversations as necessarily private", Fried, supra note 10, at 221 n.18.
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I. TH RISK OF ExTRINsIc Loss OF FREEDOM
By extrinsic loss of freedom, I mean all those ways in which lack
of privacy makes people vulnerable to having their behavior con-
trolled by others. Most obviously, this refers to the fact that people
who want to do unpopular or unconventional actions may be subject to
social pressure in the form of denial of certain benefits, jobs or promo-
tions or membership in formal or informal groups, or even blackmail,
if their actions are known to others. And even if they have reason to
believe that their actions may be known to others and that those others
may penalize them, this is likely to have a chilling effect on them that
will constrain the range of their freedom to act.22 Remember, it is by
inducing the consciousness of visibility that the panopticon, in Fou-
cault's words, "assures the automatic functioning of power."
Ruth Gavison writes, "Privacy . prevents interference, pres-
sures to conform, ridicule, punishment, unfavorable decisions, and
other forms of hostile reaction. To the extent that privacy does this, it
functions to promote liberty of action, removing the unpleasant conse-
quences of certain actions and thus increasing the liberty to perform
them."23 This is not just a matter of the freedom to do immoral or
illegal acts. It applies equally to unpopular political .actions which
have nothing immoral or illegal about them.
Moreover, in a free society, there are actions thought immoral by
many or even a majority of citizens that a significant minority thinks
are morally acceptable. The preservation of freedom requires that,
wherever possible, the moral status of these actions be left to individu-
als to decide for themselves, and thus that not everything that a major-
ity of citizens thinks is immoral be made illegal. (Think here of
pornography, gambling, drunkenness, homosexual or pre- or extra-
marital heterosexual sex.) If it would be wrong to force people legally
to conform to the majority's views on such issues, it will be equally
wrong to use harsh social pressure to accomplish the same effect. For
this reason, Mill argued in On Liberty against both legal enforcement
of morality and its informal social enforcement by stigmatization or
ostracism.24
22. "The usual arguments against wiretapping, bugging, a National Data Center, and pri-
vate investigators rest heavily on the contingent possibility that a tyrannical government or un-
scrupulous individuals might misuse them for blackmail or victimization. The more one knows
about a person, the greater one's power to damage him", Stanley I. Berm, Privacy, Freedom, and
Respect for Persons, in PDOP, supra note 9, at 226.
23. Gavison, supra note 13, at 363-64.
24. JoHN StuARt Mni., ON LmairTY 9 (Hackett Publishing Company, 1978; originally
published in 1859), inter alia.
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Mill was not, by the way, against people trying to persuade one
another about what is moral. Actually, he thought we should-do more
of that than we normally do. He distinguished, however, between ap-
peals to reason and appeals to force or its equivalent, harsh informal
social penalties. Trying to persuade the minority by making argu-
ments and producing evidence can be done in public forums without
pointing fingers, and thus without putting any particular person at risk.
Most importantly, it leaves the members of the minority free to make
up their own minds.25 Threatening the minority with stigmatization or
ostracism works like force because it changes people's actions by at-
taching painful consequences to them, without changing their minds at
all. Privacy protects people from the operation of this force, and thus
preserves their freedom.
Some may wonder whether the idea that people need privacy to
act freely is based on too dim a view of human character. Those who
raise this doubt think that people with strong characters will be able to
resist social pressure, and thus only those with weak characters need
dark private comers in order to act freely. In different ways, this ob-
jection can be raised against all the risks to privacy that I shall de-
scribe, and so I want to give a general answer to it. The answer has
three parts:
First, laws and social practices generally have to be designed for
the real people that they will govern, not for some ideal people that we
would like to see or be. Just as Madison observed that if people were
angels we wouldn't need government at all,26 so we might add that if
people were heroes we wouldn't need privacy at all. Since people are
neither angels nor (except in a few instances) heroes, we need both
government and privacy.
Second, just because people are not angels, some will be tempted
to penalize those who act unconventionally. Even if people should
ideally be able to withstand social pressure in the form of stigmatiza-
tion or ostracism, it remains unjust that they should suffer these pain-
ful fates simply for acting in unpopular or unconventional ways. In
any actual society we will need pivacy to prevent this injustice.
Third, suppose we wanted to make our citizens into the sorts of
strong-willed people who could resist social pressures. We would still
have to give them experience in formulating their own judgments and
in acting upon those judgments. And this experience will have to be
given to them before they have the strong characters we hope them to
attain. They will have to be sheltered from the pressures toward social
25. It also forces the majority to test its own beliefs in the open court of public discussion.
26. Federalist No. 51(James Madison).
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conformity while they are still vulnerable, in order to become the sorts
of people who are not vulnerable. They will need privacy in order to
become the sorts of people who don't need it.27 Much as Mill felt that
liberty was a school for character,28 so too is privacy. And, since this
school must provide continuing education for adults as well as for
children, we will need privacy as an abiding feature of the society. In
short, the vast majority of actual people need privacy for free action,
and those who do not will need privacy to become that way. With or
without heroes, we will need privacy.
II. THE RISK OF INTRINsic Loss OF FREEDOM
By intrinsic loss of freedom, I point to ways in which denial of
privacy limits people's freedom directly, independently of the ways in
which it makes them susceptible to social pressure or penalties. Put
differently, I want here to suggest that privacy is not just a means of
protecting freedom, it is itself constitutive of freedom in a number of
important ways.
To start, recall the discussion about the place of control in the
definition of privacy.2 9 I concluded there that control is not part of
privacy, but in some cases it is part of what privacy makes possible.
For me to be able to decide who touches my body, or who knows the
details of my personal history, those things must be generally not ac-
cessible to others at their discretion. That means that if those things
are not shielded by privacy, I am automatically denied certain impor-
tant choices. This is what I mean by an intrinsic loss of freedom. I
am not here denied the choices by fear of certain consequences; I am
denied them directly because privacy is the condition of their being
choices for me in the first place.
Another intrinsic loss of freedom is the following. A number of
writers have emphasized the ways in which some actions have a dif-
ferent nature when they are observed than they do when they are not.3"
Tliis is clearest in cases that are distant from IVHS: Criticizing an
27. "[Plrivacy also contributes to learning, creativity and autonomy by insulating the indi-
vidual against ridicule and censure at early stages of groping and experimentation", Gavison,
supra note 13, at 364.
28. "He who lets the world, or his own portion of it, choose his plan of life for him has no
need of any other faculty than the ape-like one of imitation. He who chooses his plan for himself
employs all his faculties", Mnt., ON LmERTY 56.
29. See notes 10 through 15 above, and accompanying text.
30. 'The observer makes the act impossible... in the sense that.the actor now sees it in a
different light", Benn, supra note 22, at 226. "Aware of the observer, I am engaged in part in
viewing or imagining what is going on from his or her perspective. I thus cannot lose myself as
completely in the activity", Wasserstrom, supra note 9, it 324. See also, the sensitive discussion
in Robert S. Gerstein, Intimacy and Privacy, in PDOP, supra note 9, at 265-71.
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individual in front of others is a different act than uttering the same
critical words to him in private. And, of course, making love before
an audience is something quite different from the same act done in
private. In the case of our informational panopticon the alteration is
more subtle. Every act, say, driving to destination X at time T, is now
a more complex event: It now becomes driving to X at T and creating
a record of driving to X at T. These differ from one another as leaving
a message on someone's answering machine differs from rehearsing
the same words in one's imagination. If my every driving act (not to
mention all the other acts visible in the informational panopticon) is
also the depositing of a record, not only are my acts changed, but my
freedom is limited: I am no longer free to do the act of simply driving
to X at T without leaving a record.
With this, I lose as well the freedom of acting spontaneously. In
a society which collected data on all of an individual's transactions,
Richard Wasserstrom writes,
one would be both buying a tank of gas and leaving a part of a
systematic record of where one was on that particular date. One
would not just be applying for life insurance; one would also be
recording in a permanent way one's health on that date and a vari-
ety of other facts about oneself. No matter how innocent one's
intentions and actions at any given moment... persons would think
more carefully before they did things that would become part of the
record. Life would to this degree become less spontaneous and
more measured.'
When you know you are being observed, you naturally identify
with the outside observer's viewpoint, and add that alongside your
own viewpoint on your action. This double vision makes your act
different, whether the act is making love or taking a drive. The targets
of the panopticon know and feel the eye of the guard on them, making
their actions different than if they were done in private. Their reper-
toire of possible actions diminishes as they lose those choices whose
intrinsic nature depends on privacy.
III. SYMBOLIC RISKs
Elsewhere I have argued that privacy is a social ritual by which
we show one another that we regard each person as the owner of her-
self, her body, her thoughts." It is for this reason that privacy is gen-
erally absent from organizations like monasteries, armies, communist
31. Wasserstrom, supra note 9, at 328.
32. Jeffrey Reiman, Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood, Phil. & Pub. Aff. 26-44 (1976),
reprinted in PDOP, supra note 9, at 300-16.
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cells and madhouses, where individuals are thought to belong to some
larger whole or greater purpose. This is also why invasions of privacy
are wrong even when they don't pose any risk to reputation or free-
dom, even when the invader will not use what he observes in any
harmful way, even when the individual is unaware that her privacy is
being invaded. Aside from any harms that invasions of privacy
threaten, such invasions are, in addition, insults. They slight an indi-
vidual's ownership of himself, and thus insult him by denying his spe-
cial dignity. The peeping tom treats his prey with unmerited, and thus
unjust, contempt.
Privacy conveys to the individual his self-ownership precisely by
the knowledge that the individual gains of his ability and his authority
to withdraw himself from the scrutiny of others. Those who lose this
ability and authority are thereby told that they don't belong to them-
selves; they are specimens belonging to those who would investigate
them.33 They are someone else's data. It is no accident that the pa-
nopticon was a design for a prison, an institution which in effect sus-
pends a person's ownership of himself because he commited a crime.
And since our informational panopticon effectively suspends self-
ownership though no crime has been committed, it conveys an unmer-
ited, and thus unjust, insult.
I said earlier that I wanted to emphasize the way in which the
panopticon makes our lives visible from a single point. Here it is
worth noting that that point is outside of us, where the guardian
stands. The panopticon symbolizes a kind of draining of our individ-
ual sovereignty away and outside of us into a single center. We be-
come its data to observe at its will-our outsides belong to its inside
rather than to our own.
I have called this a symbolic risk because it affects us as a kind of
message, a message inscribed in an institutional structure. We are not
deprived of our self-ownership in the way that slaves are deprived
permanently or the way that prisoners are deprived temporarily.
Rather, the arrangement of the institution broadcasts a image of us, to
us, as beings lacking the authority to withdraw ourselves from view.
It conveys the loss of self-ownership to us by announcing that our
every move is fitting data for observation by others. As a symbolic
message, it insults rather than injures.
33. "A man whose home may be entered at the will of another, whose conversation may be
overheard at the will of another, whose marital and familial intimacies may be overseen at the
will of another, is less of a man, has less human dignity, on that account." Edward J. Bloustein,
Privacy As an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, in PDOP, supra note 9, at
165.
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But, of course, what is symbolic is almost never merely sym-
bolic. By such symbols do we come to acquire our self-conceptions.
They shape the way we identify ourselves to ourselves and to one
another, and thus they shape our identities themselves. Growing up in
the informational panopticon, people will be less likely to acquire
selves that think of themselves as owning themselves. They will say
mine with less authority, and yours with less respect. And I think that
selves that think of themselves as owning themselves are precisely
what we understand as "moral selves". They are selves that naturally
accept ownership of their actions and thus responsibility for them.
They naturally insist on ownership of their destinies and thus on the
right to choose their own way. Here the loss of privacy threatens an
incalculable loss. What will it be worth if a man should gain the
world but lose his soul?
IV. Tim RISK OF PSYCHO-POLITICAL METAMORPHOSIS
The risk just discussed is not that we shall lose something we
now enjoy, but that we will become something different than we cur-
rently are, something less noble, less interesting, less worthy of re-
spect. This is the fear expressed in the quote from Hubert
Humphrey? 4 What I shall say now continues in this vein.
The film Demolition Man portrays a future society characterized
by wide-spread information gathering, including a full IVHS system.
However, to me, the most interesting feature of the film is that the
denizens of the society depicted there speak, and thus seem to think, in
a way that 'can only be described as childish. They have an oversim-
plified way of labeling things and experiences, and appear to have a
repertoire of responses that is limited in number and nuance. Their
emotional lives are, you might say, reduced to the primary colors,
without shade or tone, disharmony or ambiguity. I want to suggest
that this is a product of the informational panopticon in which they
live. Total visibility infantilizes people. It impoverishes their inner
life and makes them more vulnerable to oppression from without.
There is already a widely recognized correlation between privacy
and adulthood. But it is normally understood in the reverse direction:
The less mature a person is the less privacy he gets, and he gets more
privacy as he moves toward adulthood. I want to suggest that this is a
two-way street. The deprivation of privacy stunts maturity, keeps
people suspended in a childish state.
34. Hubert H. Humphrey, Forward to EDWARD V. LONO, THm INTRUDERS, at viii (New
York, 1967).
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How does this happen? Consider the words of Edward Bloustein,
President of Rutgers University:
The man who is compelled to live every minute of his life
among others and whose every need, thought, desire, fancy or grati-
fication is subject to public scrutiny, has been deprived of his indi-
viduality and human dignity. Such an individual merges with the
mass. His opinions, being public, tend always to be conventionally
accepted ones; his feelings, being openly exhibited, tend to lose
their quality of unique personal warmth and to become the feelings
of every man. Such a being, although sentient, is fungible; he is
not an individual.35
But this is only the beginning. Consider the process and where it
leads: To the extent that a person experiences himself as subject to
public observation, he naturally experiences himself as subject to pub-
lic review. As a consequence, he will tend to act in ways that are
publicly acceptable. People who are shaped to act in ways that are
publicly acceptable will tend to act in safe ways, to hold and express
and manifest the most widely-accepted views, indeed, the lowest-com-
mon denominator of conventionality.36 (Think here of the pressure
that TV sponsors exercise against anything unconventional, in their
fear of offending any segment of the purchasing population.) But,
thought and feeling follow behavior. (Pascal said: "Kneel down,
move your lips in prayer, and you will believe.") 37 Trained by society
to act conventionally at all times, people will come so to think and so
to feel. Their inner lives will be impoverished to the extent that their
outer lives are subject to observation. Infiltrated by social convention,
their emotions and reactions will become simpler, safer, more predict-
able, less nuanced, more interchangeable. This much is noted by
Bloustein, but I think the process goes further.
As the inner life that is subject to social convention grows, the
still deeper inner life that is separate from social convention contracts
and, given little opportunity to develop, remains primitive. Likewise,
as more and more of your inner life is made sense of from without, the
need to make your own sense out of your inner life shrinks. You lose
both the practice of making your own sense out of your deepest and
most puzzling longings, and the potential for self-discovery and crea-
tivity that lurk within a rich inner life. Your inner emotional life is
35. Bloustein, supra note 33, at 188.
36. 'Tn the absence of privacy we would dare less, because all our failures would be on
record", Gavison, supra note 13, at 364.
37. This is attributed to Pascal, without citation. Louis AL'mussER, LENIN A Prmuoso-
PHn (B. Brewster trans., 1971).
1995]
42 COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
impoverished, and your capacity for evaluating and shaping it is
stunted.
Thus will be lost-and this is the most ominous possibility of
all-the inner personal core that is the source of criticism of conven-
tion, of creativity, rebellion and renewal. To say that people who suf-
fer this loss will be easy to oppress doesn't say enough. They won't
have to be oppressed, since there won't be anything in them that is
tempted to drift from the beaten path or able to see beyond it. They
will be the "one-dimensional men" that Herbert Marcuse feared.38
The art of such people will be insipid decoration, and their politics
fascist.
Here, I think, we reach something deep and rarely noted about
the liberal vision-something that shows the profound link between
liberalism and privacy, and between those two and democracy. The
liberal vision is guided by the ideal of the autonomous individual, the
one who acts on principles which she has accepted after critical review
rather than simply absorbing them unquestioned from outside.39
Moreover, the liberal stresses the importance of people making sense
of their own lives, and of having authority over the sense of those
lives. All this requires a kind of space in which to reflect on and
entertain beliefs, and to experiment with them-a private space.
Deeper still, however, the liberal vision has an implicit trust in
the transformational and ameliorative possibilities of private inner life.
Without this, neither democracy nor individual freedom have worth.
Unless people can form their own views, democratic voting becomes
mere ratification of conventionality, and individual freedom mere vol-
untary conformity.' And, unless, in forming their own views, people
can find within themselves the resources for better views, neither de-
mocracy nor individualism can be expected to improve human life.
This concludes my catalogue of the risks posed by loss of pri-
vacy. As I suggested earlier, the risks give us a negative image of the
value to us of maintaining privacy. I can sum up that value as: the
protection of freedom, moral personality, and a rich and critical inner
life. If IVHS endangers these values, then we will have to bring the
heretofore public information about travel on public streets under the
scope of privacy.
38. HERBERT MARcusa, ONE-DuAENsioNAL MAN (Beacon Press, 1964).
39. See Benn, supra note 22, at 241 for a statement of this ideal and a discussion of its
relation to privacy.
40. "Part of the justification for majority rule and the right to vote is the assumption that
individuals should participate in political decisions by forming judgments and expressing prefer-
ences. Thus, to the extent that privacy is important for autonomy, it is important for democracy
as well," Gavison, supra note 13, at 369-70.
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But that is just the beginning of what is necessary. Here we
should remember Bentham's and Foucault's recognition that the pa-
nopticon works even if no one is in the guard house. The risks that are
posed by the informational panopticon come not from being seen, but
from the knowledge that one is visible. And this means that protecting
ourselves from the risks I have described will be harder than we might
imagine.
Consider that privacy can be protected in two ways, which I shall
call, respectively, the formal conditions of privacy and the material
conditions. By the formal conditions of privacy, I mean generally the
rules that either specifically give one a right to privacy or that have a
similar effect (such as conventions of modesty or reserve, of appropri-
ate levels of curiosity or prying). Such rules might be legal or custom-
ary or moral, or some combination of these. By the material
conditions of privacy, I mean physical realities that hinder others in
gathering information about or experiences of you, things like locks,
fences, doors, curtains, isolation and distance.
It should be clear that one might have formal conditions without
the material, and that the formal conditions might be effective without
the material being in place. For example, people packed like sardines
in a rush-hour subway train have a way of respecting each other's
privacy even though they have, materially, extensive access to one
another's bodies. On the other hand, one can have the material condi-
tions of privacy without the formal, and the material, conditions might
be effective without the formal being in place. For example, after my
students are duly shocked by Hobbes' defense of absolute political
authority,4 I remind them that, when Hobbes wrote, it took about a
week to travel from the west coast of England to the east coast, and
about two weeks from north coast to south.4 2 An absolute sovereign
in Hobbes' time, without any formal constraints, surely had less actual
ability to invade his subjects' lives than, say, a contemporary U.S.
president, even with all our constitutional safeguards.
That constitutional safeguards can be and have been ignored by
the powerful bears a lesson for us: Material conditions of privacy
more reliably prevent invasions of privacy than formal conditions can.
Material conditions have a kind of toughness that the formal condi-
tions never can match. Thus, formal conditions of privacy can never
41. THOMAS HOBBES, LEvIArHAN (Prometheus Books, 1988)(1651).
42. J. CROFTS, PACKHORSE, WAGGON AND Posr. LAND CARRIAGE AND COMMUNICATIONS
UNDER nm TUDoRS AND STUARTs 84-88, 122-24, 141-142 (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967);
and Sidney and Beatrice Webb, THE SToRY oF THE KING'S HIGHWAY 62-84,(Vo1. V of English
Local Govermment)(Archon Books, 1963)(1913). I am indebted to my colleague Terence Mur-
phy of the American University Department of History for these references.
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fully guarantee protection of privacy when the material conditions for
invading privacy are at hand. The material conditions for invading
privacy are a kind of power, and power is always tempting, often cor-
rupting, and, to paraphrase Lord Acton, the more power there is the
more coriupting it is likely to be.
This is important because the accumulation of detailed informa-
tion about people's goings and comings is a material condition for
invading privacy. What's more, the continued and increasing amas-
sing of this and all the other sorts of information that make up the
informational panopticon seems to me to be inevitable. This is for the
simple reason that, as with IVHS, all of the elements of the informa-
tional panopticon serve good purposes and can and will be put in place
with the best of intentions. Here we should remember Louis Bran-
deis's warning, quoted at the outset,43 and watch out for threats of
liberty dressed in beneficent intentions. The existence of all this col-
lected information and of the technical ability to bring these different
records together will add up to an enormous capacity to amass detailed
portraits of people's lives-in short, material conditions for invasion
of privacy on unheard-of scale. One has to be very optimistic indeed
about the power of rules, to think that formal guarantees of privacy
will protect us. And, to the extent that we are not so optimistic, we
will experience ourselves as visible even if we are not being observed,
which will bring in its train all the risks earlier described.
To the extent that the material conditions for our virtually total
visibility come ineluctably into place in the years ahead, we will need
not only tb prevent the misuse of information but to prevent the fear
that it is being misused. That is the lesson of the Panopticon. We will
have to protect people not only from being seen but from feeling visi-
ble. Thus, we will need more than ever before to teach and explain
the importance of privacy, so that respect for it becomes second na-
ture, and violation of it repugnant. And, of course, we will need more
than ever to make sure that our fellows are complying with the formal
rules that protect privacy. If we are going to protect privacy in the
informational panopticon, we're really going to have to keep an eye
on one another!
43. Olnstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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